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Abstract This article uses factor analysis to identify
the underlying dimensions of strategic and structural
entry barriers. We find that, in the perception of firms,
both types of barriers are important and that the
effectiveness of strategic barriers depends on attri-
butes of the market structure. Based on the seven
generic factors, a conjoint analysis is carried out to
identify the most important factors perceived by firms.
The conjoint analysis shows that in particular the
barriers rooted in three underlying dimensions require
attention of market authorities as they may prevent
new entrants from entry: capital, access to distribution
channels and strategic action. Remarkably, govern-
ment rules and regulations, product differentiation,
research and development (R&D) and advertising
constitute minor entry problems according to firms.
Keywords Barriers to entry  SMEs 
Antitrust policy  Entrepreneurship
JEL Classifications L11  L26  L44  L52
1 Introduction1
Small firms, and in particular new firms, serve as
agents of change (Audretch 2006; Acs and Storey
2004). Entries of new innovative firms foster the
dynamics in the economy. Simultaneously, newcom-
ers may have an equilibrating function, as firms will
enter the market if profits are above the long-run
competitive level. The upshot is that entry contributes
to allocative as well as dynamic efficiency in the
market (Audretch and Thurik 2001). However, entry
barriers can prevent firms from entering the market
and hamper the process of allocative and dynamic
efficiency. In line with this perspective it is easily
understood that barriers to entry constitute an impor-
tant issue in entrepreneurship and competition policy.
In the framework of competition policy market
authorities control the behaviour of firms in specific
markets and may impose sanctions if market power is
abused. A related issue, which may be raised in the
framework of entrepreneurship policy, concerns the
question of whether entry barriers restrict the activ-
ities of potential entrepreneurs in the modern
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economy. Is this an incidental problem related to
specific sectoral characteristics or a more general
phenomenon that hampers entrepreneurial activity in
the economy at large?
The latter issue is relevant for policy makers, as
quite a body of literature shows that there is a positive
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and
national economic growth in developed countries
(Van Stel et al. 2005; Acs and Storey 2004). In The
Netherlands, a country neither among the laggards
nor among the top dogs of entrepreneurial activity,
this resulted in a debate among politicians and policy
makers on policies to encourage entrepreneurship. In
this debate two reasons have been given to explain
the mediocre position of The Netherlands: existing
‘‘entry barriers’’ and/or a deficient ‘‘entrepreneurial
attitude’’. The former phenomenon is related to
characteristics of the industries or a lack of servicing
industries (e.g. access to credit and venture capital),
while the latter phenomenon is more related to
psychological and cultural factors and alternative
opportunities in the labour market. This article aims
at investigating the importance of different entry
barriers in the Dutch economy. If vigorous barriers
are detected they will at least partly account for the
somewhat disappointing level of entrepreneurial
activity in The Netherlands.
A large body of literature discusses a variety of
entry barriers (see e.g. Shepherd 1997; Karakaya and
Stahl 1989). Blees et al. (2003) identified 37 barriers
to entry on the basis of a comprehensive literature
study. As some of these barriers seem to overlap, two
questions arise. Firstly, one may question whether all
these barriers are important. Secondly, it is interest-
ing to verify whether these barriers are driven by a
reduced set of underlying factors. Some research has
been done in this respect (Karakaya 2002; Karakaya
and Stahl 1989). A major flaw in this work is that it
only concerns manufacturing industries (larger firms).
Moreover, Karakaya (2002) mainly addresses struc-
tural entry barriers and is based on a relatively small
number of observations.
Several authors stress the need for empirical
evidence on extant barriers to entry (Scherer 1988;
Geroski et al. 1990; Geroski 1995; Bunch and Smiley
1992; Karakaya 2002). This article addresses firms’
perceptions with regard to entry barriers. Considering
the difficulties of carrying out empirical research on
strategic entry barriers (Bunch and Smiley 1992), we
decided to interview firms and measure their percep-
tion regarding the importance of specific entry
barriers. As our study is mainly interested in those
barriers that prevent potential entrants from entering
an industry, perceptions regarding entry barriers are
key. Subjective opinions of business owners influence
both growth motivation and direct behaviour
(Davidsson 1991). Several researchers followed the
same line of thought (Bunch and Smiley 1992; Singh
et al. 1998; Karakaya 2002; Aidis 2005). However,
all these studies focused on a limited subset of entry
barriers or a specific group of companies or indus-
tries. Some researchers stress the importance of
strategic barriers (Scherer 1988; Bunch and Smiley
1992), while others emphasise the role of structural
barriers (Bain 1956; Karakaya 2002). In line with this
a limited set of predetermined structural and/or
strategic barriers were analysed.
For this study it was important to interview a large
number of firms, representative for the Dutch econ-
omy, and to include all potential barriers identified in
the literature study (Blees et al. 2003). Our sample
encompasses the services and manufacturing sectors
and involves, in line with the size distribution of firms
in the economy, mainly small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). First we asked the firms to what
extent the specific barriers mentioned in the literature
occur in their markets of operation. Subsequently,
factor analysis was used to identify the latent
variables that drive the perceptions of the respon-
dents. The large number of structural and strategic
entry barriers included in our survey provides a
proper basis to assess the existence of the underlying
dimensions. Moreover, it can be verified whether
strategic barriers are grouped in new latent variables
separated from structural barriers or that structural
and strategic barriers are driven by the same latent
force. Finally, a conjoint analysis is carried out to
assess the importance of these underlying dimen-
sions, i.e. to identify the most (un)attractive market
situation and the most vigorous entry barriers (fac-
tors). This part of the study shows which entry
barriers really affect entry decisions. In a quasi-
experimental setting, different profiles of markets,
containing different sets of entry barriers, were
presented to the firms and they were asked to rank
the attractiveness of those markets.
The next section starts with a concise overview of
the literature on entry barriers. The concept is defined
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and the method to measure the importance of entry
barriers is discussed in Sect. 3. Subsequently the
findings are discussed. Section 4 presents the per-
ceptions of firms regarding existing barriers. The
underlying factors are identified in Sect. 5, and
Sect. 6 discusses the results of the conjoint analysis.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
Two traditions can be distinguished in the literature
on entry barriers: the industrial organisation perspec-
tive (e.g. Bain 1956; Stigler 1968; Von Weizsacker
1980; McAfee et al. 2004) and the strategic manage-
ment perspective (e.g. Porter 1980, 1985; Singh et al.
1998; Robinson and McDougall 2001).
The first tradition focusses on the industry as the
unit of analysis, strives for efficiency and identifies
harmful barriers for economic development. Various
models show how entry barriers affect the behaviour
of firms and the performance of the industry.
Basically, two types of barriers are distinguished:
structural and strategic barriers to entry. The
structural barriers stem from market structure char-
acteristics and are widely discussed in the tradition of
industrial organisation. Bain (1956) introduced the
concept of ‘‘barriers to new competition’’. This
concept is based on the assumption that competition
is key to the operation of industries and that any
artificial barrier to competition may reduce the
efficient allocation of resources in the industry. Bain
stressed the importance of structural characteristics
that hamper market entry of potential competitors:
economies of scale, technological advantages, abso-
lute cost advantages etc. According to Bain the
resulting competitive forces would determine the
behaviour of firms and market performance. This
deterministic approach has been criticised within the
discipline of industrial organisation. By the late 1970s
these views became known as ‘‘the new industrial
organisation’’ (Geroski et al. 1990). They stressed the
importance of behaviour as a determinant for market
performance and market structure (in the long run).
The approach comes close to the tradition of strategic
management, as behavioural aspects are considered to
be key. However, in line with the tradition of
industrial organisation, the unit of analysis is the
industry.
The second tradition, strategic management, takes
the firm as the unit of analysis and assesses entry
barriers as a resource to create competitive advantage
for individual firms. This line of thought stresses the
importance of strategic barriers. Following the
resource-based view (Barney 1991, p. 99), firms are
advised to ‘‘obtain sustained competitive advantages
by implementing strategies that exploit their internal
strengths, through responding to environmental
opportunities, while neutralising external threats and
avoiding internal weaknesses’’. In other words, firms
are encouraged to develop resources that are difficult
to copy or to substitute by competitors (Rangone
1999; Dollinger 2003). These so-called strategic
resources form the basis for a sustainable competitive
advantage. The upshot is that it is in the interest of
incumbent firms to develop strategies, for instance
creating entry barriers, that reduce the competitive
forces in the market.
From a resource-based perspective entry barriers
are considered as resources for incumbent firms.
Strikingly, from the perspective of industrial organi-
sation, this resource constitutes a potential danger as
it may hamper the allocative and dynamic efficiency
of the industry. The contradictory assessment of the
value of barriers to entry is related to the unit of
analysis and the role that competition is expected to
play in the two traditions. At the firm level it is
indeed important to strive for sustainable competitive
advantage and to exploit available barriers.
Porter (1980, pp. 9–13) specifies seven major
sources of barriers to entry: economies of scale,
product differentiation, capital requirements, switch-
ing costs, access to distribution channels, cost
disadvantages independent of scale and government
policy. Implicitly he uses a broad definition for
barriers to entry in order to encompass structural and
strategic barriers. He provides a kind of typology of
barriers to entry that firms should take into account
when their competitive strategy is developed. Porter’s
specification also shows that structural and strategic
barriers are related. The barrier may be rooted in the
market structure, but this will encourage firms to
react strategically; for example, advertising can be
considered as a structural phenomenon in the auto-
mobile industry, however, each actor may develop its
own advertising strategy (brand) that affects new
competitors. This shows that most structural barriers
may have a strategic component too. Therefore, the
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purpose of this article is not only to understand the
importance of structural and strategic barriers but
also to analyse to what extent the barriers are
coherent.
The aim of this discussion is not to identify the
right tradition. Both approaches may be relevant and
the proper choice depends on the problem under
study. We recall that the objective of this research is
to identify important entry barriers as perceived by
firms (Yip 1982; Karakaya and Stahl 1989; Singh
et al. 1998; Smiley 1988). The unit of analysis is the
firm. It aims at recognising the major constraints that
hamper firms in making their entry decision. There-
fore, a broad definition of entry barriers,
encompassing all relevant associations made by
firms, is adopted for this research. A useful definition
is found in Besanko et al. (2007, p. 289): ‘‘Barriers to
entry are those factors that allow incumbent firms to
earn positive economic profits, while making it
unprofitable for newcomers to enter the industry’’.
Two types of barriers are distinguished. Structural
barriers concern natural cost or marketing advantages
resulting from market characteristics that are exog-
enous to the firm in the short and medium term.
Strategic barriers result from a firm’s behaviour and
concern entry-deterring strategies.
With this definition in mind extant literature has
been reviewed. Table 1 gives an overview of the
types of barriers observed and provides some key
references. Some barriers are grouped together as
different names are used for similar problems to
highlight a specific focus under study; for example
‘‘control over strategic resources’’, ‘‘location’’ and
‘‘vertical integration’’ all concern the general barrier
of ‘‘securing inputs’’. Similarly ‘‘strategic behaviour
differentiation’’, and ‘‘packing the product space’’ are
grouped together. A discussion of the specific prop-
erties of each of these entry barriers is beyond the
scope of this article. For further details refer to Blees
et al. (2003).
3 Data collection
As the concepts involved are sometimes difficult to
circumscribe in unambiguous questions a pilot study
was carried out in November 2004, in which 40
students participated. The students tested the survey
and were asked to write about 100 case studies of the
companies they interviewed. The case studies
allowed us to grasp the functioning of the perceived
barriers to entry in the different industries under study
and, therefore, have facilitated the interpretation of
the results of the questionnaire. Before contacting the
sampled respondents, the final questionnaire was
pretested by telephone with potential respondents.
A large number (23) of structural and strategic
barriers to entry were presented in the questionnaire
(Table 1). However, not all the barriers identified in
the literature study (Blees et al. 2003) were addressed
separately. Time limitations forced us to reduce the
number of barriers. The firms were interviewed by
telephone; previous experiences had shown us that
this should not take more than 15 min. More time
would affect willingness to cooperate. Grouping of
barriers solved most of this problem. The literature
study showed that several barriers evoke similar
problems (e.g. brand name and customer loyalty are
related to advertising; experience advantages are part
of cost advantages; government regulations are
related to government licences; know-how is related
to level of technology and patents). Moreover, we
observed that separation could give respondents the
impression that identical issues were raised in
different questions, which could frustrate their coop-
eration. Consequently we decided to group similar
barriers as presented in Table 1.
Only five barriers mentioned by Blees et al. (2003)
were excluded from the survey. The pilot study made
it clear that we were not successful in formulating a
clear question addressing the barrier of ‘‘causal
ambiguity’’. The large majority of respondents were
SMEs for which the barrier of ‘‘divisionalisation’’ is
not relevant. ‘‘Costs of operating in foreign markets’’
and ‘‘cultural distance’’ were less relevant as most
firms supplied domestic markets. ‘‘Concentration’’
was not addressed as it operates as a general
precondition for the included strategic entry barriers.
Some aspects were covered by two separate
questions in order to be able to make a distinction
between the importance of structural and behavioural
characteristics of the barriers; for example, with
regard to advertising we presented two statements:
(1) Firms in the market have high expenditures for
advertising and promotion (structural); (2) Products
are heavily supported by advertisement and promo-
tion in order to make entry to the market less
attractive for new competitors (strategic). We claim
22 C. H. M. Lutz et al.
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that the listed barriers to entry in Table 1 give an
overview of the most important barriers discussed in
the extant literature.
Incumbent companies were asked to indicate
on a five-point Likert scale to what extent
new competitors would encounter the barrier in
Table 1 Entry barriers derived from the literature survey and addressed in the survey
Type of
barrier
Barrier to entrya Source
Structural Access to distribution/selling expenses (13) Porter (1980), Yip (1982), Karakaya and Stahl (1989), Han et al. (2001)
Access to knowledge/skilled labour/patents/
technological change (3)
Yip (1982), Harrigan (1983), Karakaya and Stahl (1989), Shepherd (1997)
Advertising (14) Spence (1980), Harrigan (1981), Yip (1982), Netter (1983), Schmalensee
(1983), Karakaya and Stahl (1989)
Capital requirements (22) Bain (1956), Porter (1980), Harrigan (1981), Yip (1982), Karakaya and
Stahl (1989), Shepherd (1997)
Sales volume (23) Yip (1982)
Cost disadvantages or experience
disadvantages of newcomers (19)
Bain (1956), Scherer (1970), Yip (1982), Karakaya and Stahl (1989),
Geroski et al. (1990), Han et al. (2001)
Costs of capital/special risks and
uncertainties (18)
Demsetz (1982), Shepherd (1997)
Customer switching costs (7) Porter (1980), Klemperer (1987, 1992), Karakaya and Stahl (1989),
Shepherd (1997), Shy (2002)
Differentiation (16) Bain (1956), Porter (1980), Schmalensee (1982), Karakaya and Stahl
(1989), Shepherd (1997), Martin (2002)
Economies of scale (17) Bain (1956), Dixit (1980), Scherer (1970), Spence (1980), Harrigan (1981),
Schmalensee (1981), Yip (1982), Geroski et al. (1990),
Government regulations—licences and
policies (12)
Porter (1980), Dixit and Kyle (1985), Karakaya and Stahl (1989), Shepherd
(1997)
Financial risk/sunk costs/asset specificity
(21)
Bain (1956), Porter (1980), Baumol et al. (1982), Geroski et al. (1990),
Sutton (1991), Shepherd (1997)
Strategic Limit pricing (6) Bain (1956), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Geroski et al. (1990), Bunch
and Smiley (1992), Singh et al. (1998)
Masking profit/gaps and asymmetric
information (8)
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Geroski et al. (1990), Bunch and Smiley
(1992)
Retaliation (4) Scherer (1970), Yip (1982), Karakaya and Stahl (1989), Bunch and Smiley
(1992), Gatignon et al. (1997), Shepherd (1997), Thomas (1999)
Collusion (2) Singh et al. (1998), Bain (1956)
Excess capacity (15) Spence (1977), Dixit (1980), Harrigan (1983), Lieberman (1987), Bunch
and Smiley (1992), Shepherd (1997), Singh et al. (1998)
Securing input/control over strategic
resources/location/vertical integration (1)
Scherer (1970), Yip (1982), Karakaya and Stahl (1989), Shepherd (1997),
Singh et al. (1998), Cabral (2000)
Strategic behaviour advertising/brand name/
loyalty (10)
Bunch and Smiley (1992), Singh et al. (1998)
Strategic behaviour differentiation/packing
the product space (20)
Schmalensee (1978), Bunch and Smiley (1992), Shepherd (1997), Cabral
(2000)
Strategic behaviour distribution channels
(11)
Singh et al. (1998)
Strategic behaviour knowledge/pre-emptive
patents (5)
Bunch and Smiley (1992), Singh et al. (1998)
Strategic behaviour R&D (9) Harrigan (1981), Yip (1982), Daems and Douma (1985), Bunch and
Smiley (1992), Singh et al. (1998)
a The numbers in brackets refer to the barriers presented in Table 2
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question.2 Ideally the survey should have addressed
new and potential competitors with feasible business
plans.3 It could be argued that perceptions of
incumbents may show some bias as these firms have
surmounted existing barriers, i.e. knowing how to
solve a problem makes the problem trivial. Put
differently, past experiences influence mental models
and these may differ between incumbents and new
competitors.4 However, potential newcomers with
feasible business plans are difficult to identify for two
reasons. Many of these firms are in the inception
phase and not yet registered formally and, therefore,
difficult to trace. Even more important is that only
viable start-ups should be interviewed, as only the
opinion of viable firms has to be taken into account;
for example, if the bank rejects a deficient business
plan on solid grounds and refuses a loan application,
the nascent entrepreneur may indicate that capital is
indeed a major barrier, while it would have been
more appropriate to conclude that the plan was
wrong. Therefore we preferred to interview incum-
bents as they have proven to be viable.
As we are interested in barriers that (potential)
entrants may face and not the behaviour of the
specific incumbents per se, the questions were
directed at practices in the market rather than the
firm’s specific behaviour. In general, the incumbents
were asked to indicate how important a specific
barrier is if a comparable company (of the same size)
wants to enter the major product market in which the
incumbent is operational. As barriers to entry are
related to product markets and most firms manage
multiproduct operations, we explicitly referred to the
most important product market. The advantage of this
format for the question is that all companies have
experience with the market and, therefore, are able to
value the importance of the specific barrier.
In total 3,562 firms were contacted for the
telephone survey.5 This resulted in 1,074 completed
responses: 663 micro enterprises, 303 small enter-
prises and 186 medium and large enterprises (18
unknown) distributed quite equally over the sectors.6
This signifies a response rate of 30%. Of the
contacted firms, 33% refused to cooperate. Another
24% of the contacted firms could not be reached
because of an answering machine, get no answer,
number engaged or more than six attempts with no
response. Finally, with 13% of the contacted firms an
appointment was made but did not result in a
completed questionnaire because the targeted sample
was reached. Another 96 respondents were added, as
they were interviewed by our students in the pilot
phase, using the same question format for the barriers
under study.7 In total the sample consists of 1,170
Dutch firms distributed over six industries, i.e.
furniture, employment agencies, chemical industry,
ICT, food (production of bread) and retail (clothing
and shoes).82 The reply options were: not at all, nearly not, somewhat, to a
large extent, to a very large extent (or alternatively: strongly
disagree, disagree, not agree/not disagree, agree, strongly
agree).
3 Even the group of new and potential competitors can be
considered as too broad. For the research, information from the
‘‘marginal entrant’’ is needed. This marginal firm is indeed
difficult to identify. We note that the marginal firm is not
necessarily the same as a nascent entrepreneur as new
competitors may concern existing firms.
4 One of the reviewers proposed to take into account firm age
and other variables that may influence respondents’ percep-
tions, to detect potential biases. This is indeed a challenging
idea and certainly a topic for further research. Cognitive
approaches may be helpful in this respect. Regrettably,
information about these specific variables has not been part
of our survey. Moreover, only a few empirical research studies
are available (Delmar 2006). We recall that the objective of
this article is not to explain perceptions, but to identify the
different entry barriers perceived by firms operating in the
Dutch economy and how these may affect entry decisions.
Moreover, new competitors may concern existing firms in
related markets and starters may have had working experience
in incumbent firms.
5 A telephone survey was preferred for the following reasons:
generally these surveys have a higher response rate and result
in a more complete data set (fewer missing values), less time is
needed for data collection and more control over the stratified
sample is possible during the data collection process.
6 In total 209 firms belonged to the furniture sector, 204 to the
employment agency sector, 174 to the chemical industry, 215
to the information and communications technology (ICT)
sector, 157 to the food sector and 193 to the retail sector.
7 It could be argued that students are not very experienced
interviewers. However, we believe that their results are reliable
as this group was intensively supervised by the researchers. For
most barriers, no significant differences were found between
the data from the telephonic interview and the students’
interviews. Therefore, pooling the data is admissible.
8 The standaard bedrijfsindeling (SBI, standard industrial
classification) code of the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
for the industries were 361 (furniture), 74,501 (employment
agencies), 24 excluding 241 (chemical industry), 721 and 722
(ICT), 158 (food, production of bread) and 5,242 and 5,243
(retail, clothing and shoes).
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The aim was to collect data for approximately
175–200 firms per sector divided over three size
categories: micro enterprises (\10 employees), small
enterprises (10 to \50 employees) and medium and
large enterprises (50? employees). Per size category,
the firms were selected at random from the Direct
Marketing CD database of MarketSelect.9 In some
sectors all existing firms were contacted in the size
category of 50? employees, because of the limited
number of larger firms in those sectors. Most
observations are in the class of \10 employees, or
micro firms. In the retail sector, we only have five
observations of firms with 50 employees or more. As
the sample was drawn from a database including
subsidiaries and branches of larger firms, and
responses were provided by local managers, the
questions concern employment figures of the selected
subsidiary. About 40% of the interviewed establish-
ments are related to a larger company.
The MarketSelect database was used to test for
nonresponse bias. Smaller firms were more willing to
participate in the research than large firms. This holds
for the total sample as well as for the sectors
furniture, employment agencies, chemical industry
and ICT. No significant differences related to size
were found for the food industry and retail. In the
Table 2 Perceived barriers to entry
Barrier to entry Mean score* ‘‘Sectoral’’ differences** ‘‘Scale’’ differences***
1. Securing input 1.73 f,b [ e; f,e,i \ c,r; c,b \ r; i \ b Ns
2. Collusion 1.78 f \ e,b,r; e [ f,c,i,b,r; c \ r MIE [ SE, MLE
3. Knowledge 1.92 f,e,i,b,r \ c; e \ i,b MIE \ SE, MLE
4. Retaliation 2.04 f \ e,c,b; c,b [ i MIE \ MLE
5. Behaviour knowledge 2.13 f,e,i,b,r \ c Ns
6. Limit pricing 2.25 e,b [ i,r Ns
7. Switching costs 2.27 f,e,b,r \ c,I MIE \ SE, MLE
8. Masking profit 2.28 f \ e,b,r Ns
9. Behaviour R&D 2.32 f,e,r \ c,I; e \ b; c [ i,b MIE \ SE, MLE
10. Behaviour advertising 2.39 f,c,i \ r; e [ i Ns
11. Behaviour distribution channel 2.42 f \ e,c,i,b; e [ f,c,i,b,r MIE \ MLE (p \ 0.10)
12. Government regulation 2.52 f,e \ c,b; f,e,c,b [ i; e,c,b [ r MIE \ SE, MLE
13. Distribution 2.77 f,i,r \ b; c [ r Ns
14. Advertising 2.80 f,c,i,b \ r; e [ i Ns
15. Excess capacity 2.87 f,i,r \ b MIE, SE \ MLE
16. Differentiation 3.03 f,e \ c,i,b,r Ns
17. Economies of scale 3.15 f [ e,i,r; e,I,r \ b; c [ i MIE \ SE, MLE
18. Costs of capital 3.24 f,c,i \ b,r; e \ b Ns
19. Cost disadvantage 3.25 f,e,c,i \ b; e \ c,r; i \ r Ns
20. Behaviour differentiation 3.33 e,i \ b MIE \ MLE
21. Financial risk 3.50 f,e,i \ b,r; c \ r; c [ i Ns
22. Capital 3.53 f,c,b,r [ i; f,e,c \ b; e \ r Ns
23. Sales volume 3.84 e \ b (p \ 0.10) MIE \ MLE (p \ 0.10)
Mean score all barriers 2.52 f \ e,c,b,r; i \ c,b,r MIE \ MLE
* Reply options were: 1 = not at all, 2 = nearly not, 3 = somewhat, 4 = to a large extent, 5 = to a very large extent
** Significant p \ 0.05 unless otherwise indicated. f = furniture, e = employment agencies, c = chemical industries, i = ict,
b = food, r = retail
*** Significant at p \ 0.05 unless otherwise indicated. MIE = micro enterprises, SE = small enterprises, MLE = medium and large
enterprises, Ns = not significant
9 The database is based on information on business registra-
tions by the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce, address
information by TNT Post and checks by MarketSelect.
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food industry, firms were less willing to participate in
the research compared with the other sectors, prob-
ably because of the Christmas rush.
For the final part of this study, the conjoint
analysis, another group of firms (n = 119) was
interviewed by students in November 2006. In the
framework of their studies they carried out a case
study assignment on the entry barriers these firms
were facing. The conjoint analysis was part of the
assignment. The selected firms were SMEs (fewer
than 100 employees) in the manufacturing (somewhat
underrepresented) and services industries (some-
what overrepresented) in the northern region of the
Netherlands. We expect that sampling bias is unlikely
as sectoral differences are limited and do not affect
the ranking of the importance of the different entry
barriers (Sect. 4). Moreover, the conjoint analysis
concerns a hypothetical market situation (Sect. 6)
which excludes sectoral and regional differences.
Literature shows that attitudes, past experiences
and competencies affect mental models and therefore
may influence the results of the conjoint analysis
(Davidsson 1991; Boyd and Vozikis 1994). Review-
ing this literature, Delmar (2006, p. 174) concludes
that ‘‘there have been several conceptual papers
advocating cognitive theories, but little empirical
research has actually been carried out where different
models have been systematically tested’’. Taking into
account the complexity of this matter and that the
objective of this article is to verify whether the
important barriers in the firms’ markets of operation
(Table 3) may affect entry decisions (Table 4), we
conclude that it is beyond the scope of this research to
analyse the relationship between perceptions, atti-
tudes, competencies and past experiences. For the
presented results of the conjoint analysis this means
that they should be interpreted with some reservation
as the sample size is small and control for potential
sampling bias is incomplete due to a lack of insight
into how perceptions are formed.
4 Findings: perceived entry barriers in the firms’
markets
In Table 2 the perceived importance of the barriers in
the markets under study is presented. Overall,
securing input for newcomers, collusion among
incumbents, access to knowledge for newcomers,
retaliation and knowledge protection by incumbents
are the least important barriers. According to the
interviewed firms most barriers concern unimportant
constraints (value lower than 3).10 The mean score is
2.5 and implies that on average barriers are not
perceived as major constraints: ‘‘nearly not’’ or
‘‘somewhat’’ important. However, some barriers
seem to play an important role: the required sales
volume for entrants, the needed capital and financial
risk for newcomers, behaviour with regard to product
differentiation by incumbents, cost disadvantage and
costs of capital for newcomers.
The importance of half of the barriers under study
did not differ significantly between firms of different
size. However, for collusion, knowledge, retaliation,
switching costs, strategic behaviour related to R&D,
government policy, excess capacity, economies of
scale and strategic behaviour related to differentiation
some significant differences are observed between
firms of different size (5% level). The excess capacity
barrier is more important in the perception of
medium-sized and large firms than for micro and
small firms. In a market with excess capacity, it will
be more difficult for a relatively large firm to enter
because it brings considerable extra capacity to the
market. This finding confirms the difference that is
made in theory between small-scale and large-scale
entry. The barrier related to collusion is somewhat
higher for micro firms. However, we note that even
the average value of micro firms for the importance
of this barrier is low. The scores for all other barriers
with significant differences between firm size classes
show that micro firms gave lower values than
medium and large firms. Even the value given by
micro enterprises to the most important barrier (sales
volume) is lower than the value given by medium and
large firms. The upshot is that, on average, micro
firms perceive lower barriers to entry than medium-
sized and large firms. This is a surprising result as
many researchers expect the opposite (see Blees et al.
2003).
In general the ranking of the importance of specific
barriers to entry is coherent between the sectors:
securing input and collusion are of minor importance
for all but two sectors (retail and employment
agencies), while sales volume and capital are most
10 The scores have the same range as previous research, see
e.g. Smiley (1988) and Karakaya (2002).
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important for all sectors. Overall, the firms valued
only a few barriers as important constraints. Capital
and sales volume are key issues in all sectors.
However, some significant sectoral differences are
observed. For instance, securing input is relatively
important in retailing and knowledge is relatively
important in the chemical industry (Kemp and Lutz
2006). The ICT and furniture industry are sectors
with relatively low barriers; the chemical, retail and
food industry show relatively high values for the
barriers under consideration.
5 The underlying dimensions of barriers to entry
The covariance matrix shows that perceptions regard-
ing several of the entry barriers are strongly coherent.
Therefore a factor analysis was carried out in order to
verify whether some underlying latent variables drive
the firms’ perceptions. The covariance matrix is
nonsingular. Based on the correlation matrix we
obtain a Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) value of 0.840,
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant at the
0.0005 level. This implies that the perceptions with
regard to each of the barriers can be explained by the
other barriers.
The determination of the number of factors is not a
straightforward process. According to the method
used, five, six or seven factors can be distinguished.11
We applied Kaiser’s rule stating that each factor
should explain at least the average variance. This
method may lead to an overestimation of the number
of factors (Horn 1965). The consequences of overes-
timation are preferred to the consequences of a
method that fails to identify separate factors (Fava
and Velicer 1996).12
The factor analysis identifies seven factors that
constitute the underlying system and drive the
perceptions with regard to entry barriers: capital,
strategic action, R&D, product differentiation, dis-
tribution, advertising and government regulations
(Table 3). In total 55% of the total variation is
explained by these factors. Nearly all entry barriers
are strongly represented by one of the factors as, in
general, the factor loadings are relatively high for
only one of the identified factors ([0.60). Except for
switching costs the attribution of a barrier to a
specific factor is straightforward. Switching costs
were positively coherent with R&D and negatively
with advertising. This indicates that R&D is more
attractive if switching costs exist. Alternatively,
advertising is less necessary if switching costs
prevail or cannot be created through brand loyalty
programs.
Some barriers are weakly represented in several
factors: securing input, economies of scale and sales
volume. In particular sales volume and economies of
scale require attention as the values given to these
barriers were high. It may be argued that these high
values result from the medium factor loadings
(between 0.21 and 0.48) on several factors (capital,
distribution, advertising, strategic action and product
differentiation). McAfee et al. (2004) called these
types of barriers ‘‘ancillary barriers’’. They do not
constitute barriers in themselves, but reinforce other
barriers to entry if they are present. Their paper
discusses the example of economies of scale that
reinforces the entry-deterrent effects of brand loyalty
and risk. Our research results show that the values
given to these specific entry barriers were generally
lower than the importance given to sales volume.
This indicates that sales volume is perceived as the
most important barrier by firms as it reflects the
cumulative effect of the identified factors. This also
shows that, even if the scores for the individual entry
barriers are quite acceptable (less than 3), the
11 Interestingly, the results are quite robust if the number of
factors is reduced to six or five. The first five factors are
identified in all these models and in general the same variables
receive high factor loadings. The advertising barriers are
identified as a separate factor in the six-factor model while
these variables receive a relatively high factor loading in the
capital and strategic action factor if a five-factor model is
estimated. In the five- and six-factor models, government
regulation receives a high loading in the factor of access to
distribution channels. The advantage of the seven-factor model
is that it leads to an unambiguous interpretation. It allows for a
distinctive role of advertising. The same applies for govern-
ment regulation. In the other models it would be difficult to
interpret meaning in connection with access to distribution
channels.
12 First a factor analysis was carried out on two-thirds of the
sample. The results were compared with a one-third holdout
sample. As the results were similar we ran a factor analysis on
the entire dataset.
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combined effect of the factors can be much stronger:
‘‘Because they can interact with and magnify each
other’s effects, what might seem like a fairly
innocuous circumstance when regarded individually
may be more problematic when the presence of other
barriers is taken into account’’ (OECD 2005, p. 19).
The factors government regulation, capital and
distribution can be considered as structural barriers.
Three factors encompass strategic and structural
elements: R&D, product differentiation and
advertising. The latter result shows that strategic
and structural effects are coherent. Although the
literature stresses the differences between the two
types of barriers, practice shows that the effectiveness
of strategic entry barriers is dependent on character-
istics of the market structure. Specific structural
attributes do not drive strategic entry barriers but are
a necessary condition for the effectiveness of strate-
gic barriers; for example, in a market for bulk
products a product differentiation strategy is
Table 3 Seven factors representing the underlying dimensionsa
Barrier Factor 1:
capital
Factor 2:
strategic action
Factor 3:
R&D
Factor 4: product
differentiation
Factor 5:
distribution
Factor 6:
advertising
Factor 7:
government
regulation
1 Costs of capital 1.012 0.197 0.077 -0.023 0.061 0.096 -0.025
Capital 0.918 -0.181 0.124 0.012 0.103 0.195 0.153
Financial risk 0.853 0.037 0.158 0.154 0.051 0.185 0.115
Cost disadvantage 0.758 0.191 0.068 0.138 0.038 -0.058 0.078
2 Limit pricing 0.209 0.967 -0.053 0.093 0.072 -0.228 0.042
Behaviour
distribution
channel
-0.046 0.797 0.243 -0.009 0.532 0.372 0.043
Retaliation -0.006 0.712 0.213 0.185 0.014 0.193 0.347
Excess capacity 0.349 0.708 -0.039 0.517 -0.117 -0.150 0.106
Masking profit 0.060 0.707 0.203 0.058 0.168 0.107 -0.109
Collusion 0.032 0.654 0.125 -0.130 -0.019 0.251 -0.017
3 Knowledge 0.081 -0.010 0.934 0.126 0.070 0.015 0.158
Behaviour R&D 0.063 0.118 0.910 0.226 0.090 -0.248 0.107
Behaviour
knowledge
0.053 0.205 0.900 -0.014 -0.017 0.219 0.124
Switching costs 0.194 0.280 0.699 0.214 -0.028 -0.634 -0.266
4 Differentiation 0.078 -0.026 0.301 0.960 0.075 0.218 0.017
Behaviour
differentiation
0.156 0.140 0.045 0.950 0.220 0.037 0.060
5 Distribution 0.113 0.078 0.155 0.130 1.255 0.044 0.141
6 Advertising 0.306 0.259 -0.019 0.174 -0.027 0.703 -0.108
Behaviour
advertising
0.255 0.419 0.134 0.354 0.009 0.646 -0.035
7 Government
regulations
0.348 0.151 0.278 0.088 0.139 -0.098 1.305
Securing input 0.293 0.206 0.432 -0.061 0.088 0.202 -0.122
Economies of scale 0.446 0.266 0.011 0.252 0.479 -0.326 -0.061
Sales volume 0.323 0.096 -0.032 0.153 0.316 -0.037 -0.006
a Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalisation
First a factor analysis was carried out on two-thirds of the sample. The results were compared with a one-third holdout sample. As the
results were similar we ran a factor analysis on the entire dataset. Bold indicates the factor loadings given for the entry barriers
included in the factors (factor loadings [ 0.60)
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ineffective, but in a market with differentiated
products a product differentiation strategy is key.
The factor of strategic action seems to resemble a
pure strategic barrier. However, even for this factor it
is clear that a strategy of excess capacity and
retaliation can be effective only if the number of
competitors is limited. This implies that the effec-
tiveness of strategic barriers depends on attributes of
the market structure.
Remarkably, despite the differences in research
setup, some similarities exist with the research results
of Karakaya. In these studies three factors in
consumer goods markets (Karakaya and Stahl 1989)
and four factors in industrial markets (Karakaya
2002) were identified: firm-specific advantages, prod-
uct differentiation, financial requirements or costs of
market entry and profit expectation of entering firms.
The last factor does not particularly concern an entry
barrier, but rather a set of indicators for market
attractiveness. The first three factors identified by
Karakaya are coherent with the factors identified in
our study. A major new insight is the difference in the
number of underlying dimensions and the identifica-
tion of factors such as strategic behaviour, R&D and
government regulations. Having identified the under-
lying dimensions the question arises of how
important these different dimensions really are.
6 Conjoint analysis to identify the most important
entry barriers
As all barriers are generally present to a smaller or
larger degree, it is preferred to measure the impor-
tance of a specific barrier in combination with the
existence of other barriers. A full-profile conjoint
analysis was conducted to test the underlying depen-
dence of the entry barriers. Conjoint analysis is
commonly used in marketing research to analyse
consumer tradeoffs (Wittink and Cattin 1989). Dur-
ing the last decade conjoint analysis has also been
used as an analytical tool in managerial decision
making (see e.g. Priem 1992; Shepherd 1999; Shep-
herd and Zacharakis 2000; McDermoll et al. 2004).
In full-profile conjoint analysis a set of hypothetical
alternatives is constructed, and each alternative or
profile stands for a combination of the distinguished
attributes. Conjoint analysis is able to derive the
importance of each attribute (relative weights) from
the choices made, between the different profiles, by
the respondents. The profiles are constructed in a
systematic way, using a decomposition approach
(Churchill 1999).
In our conjoint analysis, respondents were asked to
rank13 ten profiles (eight profiles and two holdout
profiles). As the number of 23 barriers (Sect. 4) is too
large for respondents to fully evaluate the differences
between the profiles, we used the seven identified
underlying dimensions (Sect. 5) in the conjoint
analysis; for example, one of the profiles consisted
of the following market characteristics: (1) high
expenditures on advertisement are necessary, (2) it is
difficult to access distribution channels or customers,
(3) much capital is needed for entry, (4) few
government entry regulations apply, (5) hardly any
product differentiation exists, (6) high expenditures
for R&D are needed, (7) incumbents hardly react to
entry. The barriers could have the value of high/
difficult/strong/much versus low/easy/hardly/few (see
also Karakaya and Stahl 1989).
For the construction of the profiles we used the
orthogonal factorial design module of SPSS to reduce
the number of attribute combinations and to accom-
modate multicollinearity. Given the seven market
characteristics, with two levels each, ten profiles
suffice for reliable estimates. To overcome potential
ordering effects on the attributes, the order of the
characteristics was randomly designed over the
participants.
The conjoint analysis for the managers was
introduced as if a friend was asking for advice to
start a new business and the context of the business,
a market profile, was characterised by the seven
barriers. These barriers were defined and described
in the introduction. We used the underlying items of
each factor to clarify the barrier. In analysing the
results, we estimated the effects on the aggregate
level using SPSS. In Table 4 the relative importance
of the seven barriers is presented.14 For calculating
13 In the studies of Shepherd a rating task was used: all profiles
were evaluated one at a time. We used a ranking task: all
profiles were ranked at the same time. This has some
consequences for the way the conjoint analysis is administered
and analysed.
14 No weighting criteria have been applied as all observations
concern equal hypothetical situations.
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the relative importance the following formula is
used:
Importancei ¼ 100
Rangei
Pp
i¼1
Rangei
where Range is the difference between the highest
and the lowest utility for factor i. The holdout profiles
were perfectly predicted.
The results of the conjoint analysis identify the
most attractive market profiles and allow us to deduce
the most vigorous entry barriers that influence entry
decisions. Managers find capital by far the most
important barrier, followed by access to distribution
and strategic action of incumbents. Product differen-
tiation is given the lowest value.
The results of Tables 2 and 4 seem to be somewhat
contradictory. Both tables confirm the importance of
capital. However the role of strategic action and
distribution is given more importance in Table 4 than
in Table 2, while R&D, government regulation,
advertising and product differentiation receive lower
scores. It is important to recall that the results in
Table 2 are based on the question ‘‘is the specific
barrier important in your market?’’, whereas the
results in Table 4 are based on the question ‘‘how
attractive is the market profile in which the following
set of market barriers exist?’’. The differences
between these questions explain the differences in
results. Table 2 shows the importance of a specific
barrier in the market in which the firm operates. The
scores indicate that in most markets under study the
importance of these barriers is not worrisome (gen-
erally average values below 3). In particular financial
issues seem to play an important role in existing
markets. This finding receives extra significance in
Table 4, which shows that manager/owners weigh
this factor most in markets where these barriers are
operational. Table 4 also shows that, although stra-
tegic action and distribution barriers are not really
hampering the firms in their markets of operation,
they would be perceived as a serious barrier to entry
if they were to exist. At the same time the results
show that, even if government regulation and product
differentiation would constrain the market operations,
these barriers would barely influence entry decisions
of newcomers to such a market. This result concern-
ing government regulations is not in line with
Djankov et al. (2002), but supports the findings
presented by Van Stel et al. (2006, 2007) that
administrative considerations do not seem to influ-
ence nascent or young business formation. Also the
conclusions drawn by Capelleras et al. (2008) point
in the same direction.
7 Conclusions
The literature review showed a need for empirical
evidence about entry barriers. Although many theo-
retical models exist, little empirical research has
actually been carried out. The results of this article
shed some empirical light on the phenomenon of
entry barriers and in particular on the perception of
firms regarding the importance of different structural
and strategic barriers. In the analysis two different
aspects are given attention: which entry barriers do
play a role in the markets in which the firms operate,
and which barriers would affect entry decisions most.
Barriers related to capital are most important in the
perception of existing firms. Fortunately, most bar-
riers in Table 2 seem to play only a minor role as the
average scores for their importance are rather low
(‘‘nearly not’’ or ‘‘somewhat’’ important). However,
specific barriers may reinforce each other and result
in a more substantial effect if their interaction is taken
into account; for example, the creation of sufficient
sales volume is generally perceived as the most
important entry barrier. The factor analysis shows
that this results from the interaction of barriers,
mainly related to capital and distribution.
In the debate on entry barriers some researchers
stress the importance of one of the two strands of
barriers. Table 4 provides some support for the
structuralists (capital is a structural and important
Table 4 The importance of the underlying dimensions (rela-
tive weights)
Manager/owner (n = 119)
Capital 28.2
Distribution 21.8
Strategic action 18.8
R&D 14.1
Advertising 10.0
Government regulation 6.4
Product differentiation 0.6
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barrier), but also for the behaviourists (strategic
action does matter). The factor analysis allowed us to
identify the seven underlying dimensions that drive
the system: capital, strategic action, R&D, product
differentiation, distribution, advertising and govern-
ment regulation. A striking result is that some
structural and strategic barriers are coherent: some
barriers are rooted in the market structure but this
seems to encourage firms to react strategically. The
importance of knowledge, patenting and switching
costs may serve as an interesting example. Advertis-
ing and product differentiation provide similar
examples where structural barriers induce strategic
actions. We conclude that the effectiveness of
strategic barriers depends on attributes of market
structure.
Based on the seven generic factors, a conjoint
analysis was carried out to identify the most impor-
tant factors affecting entry decisions. The analysis
shows that in general the barriers rooted in three
underlying dimensions require attention of market
authorities as they may prevent new entrants from
entry to specific markets: capital, access to distribu-
tion channels and strategic action. Government
regulations, product differentiation, R&D and adver-
tising constitute a minor entry problem according to
the firms.
The results confirm that several barriers may
influence entry decisions. Consequently, entry barri-
ers can reduce the amount of entrepreneurial activity
and potential competition. Although the data indicate
that this is not a general phenomenon in the Dutch
economy at large (Table 2) it may constrain compet-
itive forces in specific markets. Some authors claim
that in the entrepreneurial economy less attention
should be paid to regulation (Audretch and Thurik
2001). They observe a tradeoff between stimulation
versus regulation. Our findings rather suggest that
both policies complement each other: stimulation and
regulation are instruments of policies that encourage
entrepreneurial activity. In particular strategic action
and distribution policies in specific sectors may
require attention of market authorities.
We conclude with some limitations of the study.
Firstly, in Sect. 3 we discussed that only managers of
existing companies were interviewed. These manag-
ers have experience in the market and, therefore, their
perceptions regarding entry barriers may differ from,
for example, those of nascent entrepreneurs. Further
study is needed to analyse these potential differences.
Secondly, more empirical research is needed to
analyse how perceptions regarding entry barriers are
determined by past experiences, attitudes and com-
petencies. Thirdly the study is limited to a single
country and relies on data from a selected number of
industries. Extension of the research to other coun-
tries would help to determine how far these results
can be generalised. Finally, we only identified the
perceived barriers. Studies that relate the perceived
barriers to actual entry are needed (e.g. Van Stel et al.
2006, 2007). This would help to shed light on the
extent to which the identified barriers really influence
the entry process.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are
credited.
References
Acs, Z. J., & Storey, D. J. (2004). Introduction: Entrepre-
neurship and economic development. Regional Studies,
38, 871–877.
Aidis, R. (2005). Institutional barriers to small- and medium-
sized enterprise operations in transition countries. Small
Business Economics, 25, 305–318.
Audretch, D. B. (2006). Entrepreneurship, innovation and
economic growth. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Audretch, D. B., & Thurik, R. (2001). What’s new about the
new economy? Sources of growth in the managed and
entrepreneurial economies. Industrial and Corporate
Change, 10, 267–315.
Bain, J. S. (1956). Barriers to new competition. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive
advantage. Journal of Management, March, 99–120.
Baumol, W. J., Panzar, J., & Willig, R. D. (1982). Contestable
markets and the theory of industry structure. New York,
NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M., & Schaefer, S. (2007).
Economics of strategy. UK: Wiley.
Blees, J., Kemp, R. G. M., Maas, J., & Mosselman, M. (2003).
Barriers to entry. Differences in barriers to entry for
SME’s and large enterprises. EIM Research Report
H200301, The Netherlands.
Boyd, N. C., & Vozikis, G. S. (1994). The influence of self-
efficacy on the development of entrepreneurial intentions
and actions. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 18,
63–78.
Bunch, D. S., & Smiley, R. (1992). Who deters entry? Evi-
dence on the use of strategic entry deterrents. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 74(3), 509–521.
Perceptions regarding strategic and structural entry barriers 31
123
Cabral, L. M. B. (2000). Introduction to industrial organisa-
tion. London: MIT Press.
Capelleras, J.-L., Mole, K. F., Greene, F. J., & Storey, D. J.
(2008). Do more heavily regulated economies have poorer
performing new ventures? Evidence from Britain and
Spain. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(4),
688–704.
Churchill, G. A. (1999). Marketing research: Methodological
foundations. Orlando, FL, USA: Dryden.
Daems, H., & Douma, S. W. (1985). Concurrentie: Analyse en
strategie. Deventer: Kluwer.
Davidsson, P. (1991). Continued entrepreneurship: Ability,
need, and opportunity as determinants of small firm
growth. Journal of Business Venturing, 6, 405–429.
Delmar, F. (2006). The psychology of the entrepreneur. In S.
Carter & D. Jones-Evans (Eds.), Enterprise and small
business (pp. 152–175). London: Pearson Education.
Demsetz, H. (1982). Barriers to entry. American Economic
Review, 72(1), 47–57.
Dixit, A. (1980). The role of investment in entry-deterrence.
Economic Journal, 90(357), 95–106.
Dixit, A. K., & Kyle, A. S. (1985). The use of protection and
subsidies for entry promotion and deterrence. American
Economic Review, 75(1), 139–152.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A.
(2002). The regulation of entry. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, CXVII, 1–37.
Dollinger, M. J. (2003). Entrepreneurship, strategies and
resources. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Fava, J. L., & Velicer, W. F. (1996). The effects of underex-
traction in factor and component analyses. Educational
and Psychological Measurement, 56, 907–929.
Gatignon, H., Robbertson, T. S., & Fein, A. J. (1997). Incumbent
defence strategies against new product entry. International
Journal of Research in Marketing, 14, 163–176.
Geroski, P. A. (1995). What do we know about entry? Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 13, 421–440.
Geroski, P. A., Gilbert, R. J., & Jacquemin, A. (1990). Barriers
to entry and strategic competition, fundamentals of pure
and applied economics 41. Chur: Harwood Academic.
Han, J. K., Kim, N., & Kim, H. B. (2001). Entry barriers: A
dull-, one- or two-edged sword for incumbents? Unrav-
elling the paradox from a contingency perspective.
Journal of Marketing, 65, January, 1–14.
Harrigan, K. R. (1981). Barriers to entry and competitive
strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 2(4), 395–412.
Harrigan, K. R. (1983). Entry barriers in mature manufac-
turing industries. Advances in Strategic Management, 2,
67–97.
Horn, J. L. (1965). A rationale and test for the number of
factors in factor analysis. Psychometrika, 30, 179–186.
Karakaya, F. (2002). Barriers to entry in industrial markets.
Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 17(5), 379–
388.
Karakaya, F., & Stahl, M. J. (1989). Barriers to entry and
market entry decisions in consumer and industrial goods
markets. Journal of Marketing, 53, 80–91.
Kemp, R. G. M., & Lutz, C. (2006). Perceived barriers to entry:
Are there any differences between small, medium-sized
and large companies? International Journal of Entrepre-
neurship and Small Business, 3(5), 538–553.
Klemperer, P. (1987). Entry deterrence in markets with con-
sumer-switching costs. Economic Journal, 97, 99–117.
Klemperer, P. (1992). Competition when consumers have
switching costs: An overview. CEPR Discussion Paper
Series 704. London: CEPR
Lieberman, M. B. (1987). Excess capacity as a barrier to entry:
An empirical appraisal. Journal of Industrial Economics,
4, 607–627.
Martin, S. (2002). Advanced industrial economics. Malden,
MA: Blackwell.
McAfee, R. P., Mialon, H. M., & Williams, M. A. (2004).
What is a barrier to entry? American Economic Review,
94(2), 461–465.
McDermoll, A., Lovatt, S. J., & Koslow, S. (2004). Supply
chain performance measures for producers and processors
of premium beef cuts: A conjoint approach. Journal of
Chain and Network Science, 44(1), 33–43.
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982). Limit-pricing and entry
under incomplete information: An equilibrium analysis.
Econometrica, 50(2), 443–460.
Netter, J. M. (1983). Political competition and advertising as a
barrier to entry. Southern Economic Journal, 50, October,
510–520.
OECD. (2005). Barriers to entry, DAF/COMP(2005)42. Paris:
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Compe-
tition Committee.
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive strategy. NY: Free.
Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage: Creating and
sustaining superior performance. NY: Free.
Priem, R. L. (1992). An application of metric conjoint analysis
for the evaluation of top managers’ individual strategic
decision making processes: A research note. Strategic
Management Journal, 13, 143–151.
Rangone, A. (1999). A resource-based approach to strategy
analysis in small-medium sized enterprises. Small Busi-
ness Economics, 12, 233–248.
Robinson, K. C., & McDougall, P. P. (2001). Entry barriers and
new venture performance: A comparison of universal and
contingency approaches. Strategic Management Journal,
22, 659–685.
Scherer, F. M. (1970). Industrial pricing: Theory and evidence.
Chicago, IL: Rand McNally College Publishing.
Scherer, F. M. (1988). Review of the economics of market
dominance. International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation, 6, 517–519.
Schmalensee, R. (1978). Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat
breakfast cereal industry. The Bell Journal of Economics,
9(2), 305–327.
Schmalensee, R. (1981). Economies of scale and barriers to
entry. Journal of Political Economy, 89(6), 1228–1238.
Schmalensee, R. (1982). Product differentiation advantages of
pioneering brands. American Economic Review, 72(3),
350–371.
Schmalensee, R. (1983). Advertising and entry deterrence: An
exploratory model. Journal of Political Economy, 91(4),
636–653.
Shepherd, D. A. (1999). Venture capitalist’ assessment of
new venture survival. Management Science, 45(5), 621–
632.
Shepherd, W. G. (1997). The economics of industrial organisa-
tion. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall International.
32 C. H. M. Lutz et al.
123
Shepherd, D. A., & Zacharakis, A. (2000). Structuring family
business succession: An analysis of the future leader’s
decision making. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice,
24(4), 25–39.
Shy, O. (2002). A quick-and-easy method for estimating
switching costs. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 20, 71–87.
Singh, S., Utton, M., & Waterson, M. (1998). Strategic
behaviour of incumbent firms in the UK. International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, 229–251.
Smiley, R. (1988). Empirical evidence on strategic entry
deterrence. International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion, 6, 167–180.
Spence, A. M. (1977). Entry, capacity, investment and oli-
gopolistic pricing. Bell Journal of Economics, 8(2), 534–
544.
Spence, A. M. (1980). Notes on advertising, economies of
scale and entry barriers. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
November, 493–507.
Stigler, G. (1968). The organization of industry. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Sutton, J. (1991). Sunk costs and market structure: Price
competition, advertising, and the evolution of concentra-
tion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thomas, L. A. (1999). Incumbent firms’ response to entry:
Price, advertising and new product introduction. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 17, 527–555.
Van Stel, A., Carree, M., & Thurik, R. (2005). The effect of
entrepreneurial activity on national economic growth.
Small Business Economics, 24, 311–321.
Van Stel, A., Storey, D., & Thurik, R. (2007). The effect of
business regulations on nascent and young business
entrepreneurship. Small Business Economics, 28, 171–186.
Van Stel, A., Storey, D., Thurik, R., & Wennekers, S. (2006).
From nascent to actual entrepreneurship: The effect of
entry barriers. Scales paper N200508, EIM, Zoetermeer.
Von Weizsacker, C. C. (1980). A welfare analysis of barriers to
entry. Bell Journal of Economics, 11(2), 399–420.
Wittink, D. R., & Cattin, P. (1989). Commercial use of conjoint
analysis: An update. Journal of Marketing, 53, 91–96.
Yip, G. S. (1982). Barriers to entry: A corporate perspective.
Lexicon, MA: Lexicon Books.
Perceptions regarding strategic and structural entry barriers 33
123
